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Abstract 
  
This article hypothesizes that economic reforms become sustainable when the 
discursive conditions prevailing in society tip against the existing paradigm under 
exceptional circumstances. Thus, unless the pro-liberalization constituencies dominate 
the development discourse, economic reforms, initiated under the exigencies of crisis 
and conditionalities, or carried out by a convinced executive with or without the 
stimulus of a crisis, will be reversed. The discursive conditions are determined based 
on eight factors: the dominant view of international intellectuals, illustrative country 
cases, executive orientations, political will, the degree and the perceived causes of 
economic crisis, attitudes on the part of donor agencies, and the perceived outcomes 
of economic reforms. The paper seeks to prove this “discursive dominance” 
hypothesis for the Indian case through a cross-temporal, comparative review of the 
evolution of economic policy in India over six different phases.   
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Introduction  
This article attempts to reveal the precise mechanism that has controlled the transition 
of the economic system in India from a command economy to a free market economy. 
Researchers have tried to explain this phenomenon with little success thus far. 
In the words of Jagdish Bhagwati: 
The full story of why the reforms finally began to happen in 1991 under the minority 
government of Prime Minister Rao awaits research.1 
To quote M. P. Singh: 
Even more than its modest success in India, what has often puzzled analysts, is the 
political sustainability of economic reforms. Beyond the initial condition of a balance 
of payments crisis and conditionalities from multilateral monetary and financial 
agencies, the reforms have been maintained by a string of minority and/or coalition 
governments with parties with divergent policies since 1996.2 
Scholars have attempted to explain the conditions under which liberalizing reforms 
are initiated and terminated. Many studies credit crisis and subsequent World Bank- 
International Monetary Fund (WB-IMF) aid for encouraging reforms, because the aid 
tends to be accompanied by pressure to undertake policy changes.3 Correspondingly, 
factors such as, a lack of political will4 and executive orientation5 are identified as 
likely causes behind the termination of a reform. 
Alternatively, David Denoon, focusing on an India case study, identifies the 
government's desire to accelerate the Indian rate of economic growth as the principal 
motivation behind the launching of the liberalization episodes of 1966-68, 1985-87, 
and 1991-94. Liberalization efforts were ultimately brought to a halt, according to the 
author, by “advocates of controls,” who convincingly presented their actions as 
improving income distribution.6 
This article offers a more nuanced examination of this process, specifically 
considering the case of India. It is generally contended that the 1991 economic 
reforms in India were a product of a financial crisis and the resulting WB-IMF 
directives.7 While this crisis-conditionality thesis explains the precise timing of the 
reforms' inception and adoption, it does not explain why they have continued to 
govern the economic landscape. With an eye toward that void, this article posits that a 
crisis and aid can only lead to a short-term emphasis on reforms. A closer look at 
options for reforms that aid stimulates will quickly end when the crisis is overcome 
and the funding has disappeared. However, if the dominant social discourse in the 
country itself shifts against the existing mode of economic governance, reforms will 
be sustainable.8 
The existing academic literature regarding crises and reforms generally does not take 
a holistic view of the various dimensions of socio-economic and political interactions. 
For example, there currently exist two leading explanations regarding the 
“sustainability” of the economic reforms in India. The first viewpoint emphasizes the 
role of executive orientation and convictions. Rahul Mukherji compares the reforms 
of 1966 and 1991 and highlights the anti-liberal and pro-liberal executive players, 
respectively, as the key distinguishing feature of those different campaigns.9 
However, the “convictions” of an executive in a democratic context can explain, at 
most, the initiation of economic reforms, but not their sustainability. 
The economic reforms in a democratic state, the executive convictions 
notwithstanding, cannot be sustained after initiation if the dominant discourse in the 
society regarding the preferred path to economic development continues to be anti-
liberal. The unfavorable discursive conditions will manifest in the form of public 
opposition10 to any policy incompatible with those conditions. 
Mukherji's analysis also suffers, because of wrong assumptions regarding Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi's personal predilections. In Mukherji's view, Indira Gandhi 
aborted liberalization efforts because she was not convinced11 of its benefits, implying 
that she was more inclined toward socialism. However, it is difficult to make 
definitive assumptions about Indira Gandhi's supposed anti-liberal convictions, 
especially because she did not write any memoirs regarding those “convictions.”12 
Furthermore, if Indira Gandhi was so opposed to liberalization, then why did she 
begin an economic liberalization program in 1975 when she was virtually a dictator? 
This article substantiates the view that Indira Gandhi was pro-liberal and had no love 
of socialism. She aborted the liberalization efforts in 1969 in the face of strong public 
opposition to her policies and the political insecurity created due to her power 
struggle with the “Syndicate” within the Congress party.13 Thus, Mrs. Gandhi turned 
toward the rhetoric of socialism as a strategy to construct an independent base of 
popular support and win the struggle for power between the Indicate (herself) and the 
Syndicate, who hoped to manage her.14 She had to open the “survival kit” of socialism 
precisely, because public opposition to her devaluation package amply demonstrated 
that the discursive conditions in Indian society were highly anti-liberalization. 
On the other hand, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1985-9), who was decidedly pro-
liberal and was disinclined to pretend to be a socialist, also reversed economic 
liberalization efforts within two years of his rule and embraced socialist rhetoric in the 
face of public opposition. Thus, the pro-liberal orientation of an executive, in a 
democratic context, cannot succeed when the dominant development discourse in the 
society is essentially anti-liberal. However, the economic liberalization can be 
sustainable if, under exceptional circumstances, a pro-liberal discourse wins the 
competitive contestations on the desirable path to economic development. 
The second view emphasizes the ability of reformers to use stealthy means, such as 
obfuscation and betrayal. Rob Jenkins (1999) argues that the success of the 1991 
reforms owed much to concealment, rather than transparency.15 I however argue that 
liberalization by stealth is an important tool, but only when the discursive conditions 
in society are against the wisdom of these policies. The tool was used most effectively 
by Indira Gandhi during the periods 1975-77 and 1980-84. In the 1990s, however, 
there was no need and no scope for “reforms by stealth.” Jenkins' framework does not 
capture those internal factors or the external considerations that favored the 
introduction of reforms in 1991 and their continuation. 
External factors, such as the collapse of the Eastern European socialist regimes and 
the Soviet Union, failed to get the author's attention, as did overwhelming evidence 
that China (India's rival) was reaping the rewards of opening up its economy to 
foreign capital. Neglect of the political impact of the emergence and expansion of “the 
new middle class” is another lacuna. Furthermore, the dimensions of the federal 
landscape that have effectively contributed to the continuance of reforms after 
Congress (I) was removed from power in 1996 do not form part of the analysis. For 
example, it has not been recognized that the central governments since 1996 have 
been conglomerations of many regional parties that have everything to gain from the 
retreat of the central state as has been thoroughly ensured by the LPG (Liberalization, 
Privatization, and Globalization) program. 
Thus, the explanatory potential of the extant justifications for the sustainability of the 
1991 reforms is quite limited. They can best be viewed as hypotheses subject to 
further inquiry. The economic reforms of 1991 were not carried out under the cloak of 
stealth in the way that the incremental reforms of 1975 and 1981 were. The 1991 
reforms also stand in sharp contrast to the two earlier major attempts in 1966 and 
1985, which, despite being initiated by majority governments, were stalled. 
The assertion here is that an economic paradigm in a democratic nation in a particular 
period reflects the discursive dominance of that particular path of development over 
the alternative discourses. This assertion is based on the theoretical premise 
articulated by Douglass C. North and Hernando De Soto that the formal rules have to 
align with the informal rules, not the other way around.16 Indeed, institutions and 
policies are designed to match the dominant ideas of society. Thus, an economic 
paradigm commands respect, because it concurs with a deeply held social belief.17 Its 
existence rests precariously upon the discursive formation18 in society regarding the 
preferred principles of economic organization and development. 
This article seeks to support the aforementioned assertion by conducting a cross-
temporal comparative review of the evolution of the economic policy in India since its 
independence. The article discusses the solutions to nine inter-related puzzles: Why 
India adopted a command economy paradigm after independence; why she turned 
inward after the first balance of payment (BOP) crisis of 1957; why she adopted 
liberalization after 1966 BOP crisis; and why it was reversed; why incremental and 
limited liberalization reforms were adopted in response to the crises of 1973 and 
1980; why Rajiv Gandhi made a bold liberalization attempt in 1985; why was it 
stalled; why a paradigm shift happened in 1991; and what explains the sustainability 
and deepening of economic reforms since then. 
Economic liberalization can be initiated in response to a crisis and consequent 
conditionalities; it can also be initiated by a convinced executive with or without the 
stimulus of a crisis. However, the question is what determines its sustainability or 
reversal after it has been implemented? This article argues that the answer lies in the 
discursive conditions prevailing in the society in a particular period. 
Sustainability of liberalizing reforms can be achieved if eight factors collectively 
transform the discursive conditions of the society in favor of a free market economy. 
The eight factors are as follows: 
1. The dominant international economic thought during the period under 
examination should support a free market economy. 
2. The illustrative country cases and the success stories should create a 
demonstration effect. 
3. The executive should be convinced of the merits of liberalization. 
4. The executive should demonstrate a strong political will to take calculated 
risks to implement liberalization measures. 
5. There should be an economic crisis; this crisis should be severe enough to 
compel the government to seek financial assistance from donor agencies (the 
WB and IMF). 
6. The economic crisis should be perceived to be caused by the state intervention 
in the economy 
7. The donor agencies should make loans conditional upon implementing 
structural adjustment measures. 
8. The new economic policy should either result in decidedly positive and visible 
outcomes or make a credible sounding promise for such outcomes in the future 
to enable people to endure short-term difficulties without reaction. 
In the presence of the aforementioned conditions, the constituencies favoring 
liberalization will be able to shape and dominate the social discourse regarding the 
preferred path of development. As a result, the policy change will be sustainable. The 
basic argument previously outlined is intended to motivate the reader to follow the 
rest of the article carefully as we make our way through the analysis. Having 
summarized these conclusions in Table 1, I will use the rest of the article to convince 
the reader that these conclusions are valid.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Factors Influencing the Direction of Economic Policy Making 
 
Notes:  N.A. : Not applicable, because the Indian government did not approach the WB or IMF for 
loans.   
TINOA factor implies that there was no other alternative to trying reforms. 
(a) Success of the Second FYP and ISI reinforced anti-liberal discourse. 
(b) Failure of devaluation reinforced anti-liberal discourse. 
(c) Limited and concealed liberalization did not attract media attention or public apprehensions, while 
forced vasectomy drive turned the political discourse against the ruling Congress Party. 
(d) No public reaction as the government emphasized continuity over change, while communal unrest 
in several regions dominated the political discourse. 
(e) Anti-liberal discourse was not as strong in 1985 compared to 1966. Thus, the policy reversal in 
1987 was also not as radical as it had been in 1969.  
(f) All factors determining the discursive conditions turned antagonistic to the socialism discourse.  
* Given the significance of a strong economic recovery and declining inflation for political support, it 
can be safely assumed that the Congress Party would have won the 1977 elections, had the program of 
forced vasectomy not been carried out (see section III).
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